* fix(mcp): skip stdin EOF handlers when MCP_STDIO=1 OpenClaw's bundle-mcp gateway and similar wrappers pipe the JSON-RPC handshake on stdin then close their stdin half. Pre-fix, both stdin 'end' and 'close' listeners (server.ts:65-66 and serve.ts:204-206) treated this as a permanent disconnect and shut the server down before the first tool call arrived. Guard both sites with `process.env.MCP_STDIO !== '1'`. Signal handlers (SIGTERM/SIGINT/SIGHUP), transport.onclose, and the parent-process watchdog still cover legitimate shutdown paths. The serve.ts site threads the env read through an injectable `mcpStdio?: boolean` on ServeOptions so tests stay isolated (no process.env mutation per scripts/check-test-isolation.sh R1). Tests: 3 new cases in test/serve-stdio-lifecycle.test.ts pin the guard's invariants — mcpStdio=true must NOT trigger shutdown on stdin EOF, signals must still drive shutdown with mcpStdio=true, and mcpStdio=false (default) preserves existing CLI behavior. 25/25 pass. Origin: PR #870. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(oauth): honor token_endpoint_auth_method=none for PKCE public clients RFC 7591 §3.2.1: when a DCR client declares token_endpoint_auth_method="none" (PKCE-only public clients like Claude Code, Cursor), the authorization server MUST NOT issue a client_secret. Pre-fix, registerClient unconditionally minted a secret, and the MCP SDK's clientAuth middleware then rejected valid public-client flows on /token because it expected client.client_secret to match. Three changes to src/core/oauth-provider.ts:registerClient: - Gate clientSecret generation on isPublicClient = (auth_method === 'none'). Public clients store client_secret_hash = NULL. - Omit client_secret from the response payload for public clients. Confidential clients (default client_secret_post and explicit client_secret_basic) keep their existing one-time-reveal shape. - Normalize NULL secret_hash to JS undefined in getClient so SDK middleware (which checks client.client_secret === undefined, not === null) correctly identifies public clients and skips the secret-comparison branch on /token. Schema is already permissive (client_secret_hash TEXT, no NOT NULL on both src/schema.sql and src/core/pglite-schema.ts) — no migration needed. Tests: 5 new cases in test/oauth.test.ts pin: - public client → no client_secret in response (#11 from plan) - default auth_method → secret unchanged (regression guard) - explicit client_secret_post → secret unchanged - getClient NULL→undefined normalization - PKCE full /authorize → /token end-to-end with no secret (#15 from plan) 69/69 oauth.test.ts cases pass. typecheck clean. Origin: PR #909. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(serve-http): --bind HOST, default to loopback (127.0.0.1) Adds `gbrain serve --http --bind <interface>` to control which network interface the HTTP MCP server listens on. Default flipped from `0.0.0.0` (pre-v0.34) to `127.0.0.1` (v0.34.0+). Why the flip: gbrain's primary use case is a personal-knowledge brain on a laptop. The previous default exposed brains on every interface — one accidental `--http` invocation away from publishing the brain to a LAN. Server operators who need remote access pass `--bind 0.0.0.0` (or a specific interface). Codex's outside-voice on the original PR #864 correctly flagged that the additive flag wasn't actually the fix; the default needed to change for the safety claim to hold. If `--public-url` is set but `--bind` is unset, runServeHttp prints a loud stderr WARN at startup recommending `--bind 0.0.0.0`. Declaring a public URL while quietly binding loopback is almost always a misconfiguration; we want the operator to see it on first start, not silently fail remote requests. Startup banner now includes a `Bind:` row so the listening interface is visible alongside Port / Engine / Issuer. Origin: PR #864, extended with D11 (default flip) per /plan-eng-review codex outside-voice review. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): seal source-isolation leak on read path (P0) Pre-fix, an authenticated OAuth MCP client scoped to source-A could enumerate source-B pages via six read-side ops: search, query (text AND image paths), list_pages, traverse_graph, and find_experts. The v0.31.8 source-scoping pattern shipped through dispatch.ts but the op handlers never threaded ctx.sourceId into their engine calls, and hybridSearch.ts:223's explicit SearchOpts rebuild dropped sourceId even when callers passed it. Sealing the leak: - src/core/operations.ts adds sourceScopeOpts(ctx), the canonical precedence ladder: ctx.auth.allowedSources (federated) wins over ctx.sourceId (scalar) wins over nothing. Threaded into all 5 read-side op handlers + the query-image-path searchVector call (the 6th leak surface codex caught in plan review). - src/core/search/hybrid.ts:223 now threads sourceId + sourceIds fields through the inner SearchOpts rebuild. The explicit pick shape is preserved (HNSW inner-CTE ordering depends on it) but extended. - src/core/types.ts adds sourceIds?: string[] to SearchOpts + PageFilters (D9: federated read needs array-shaped engine filter or fan-out; array wins for hot retrieval). - src/core/operations.ts AuthInfo gains sourceId + allowedSources (D2: identity surface symmetric with the federated_read column #876 will add). - Both engines now apply WHERE source_id = $N (scalar) or = ANY($N::text[]) (array) at the SQL layer for searchKeyword, searchKeywordChunks, searchVector, listPages, traverseGraph, traversePaths. Array form wins when both are set. The searchVector filter pushes into the inner HNSW CTE (codex flagged this placement during plan review). - traverseGraph + traversePaths signatures gain opts.sourceId + opts.sourceIds; engine.ts interface updated. - findExperts (the whoknows op, D3 5th leak surface) accepts sourceId + sourceIds and threads them into its internal hybridSearch call. PR #861 was authored before v0.33 shipped so this op wasn't covered in the original PR. Auth wiring: - GBrainOAuthProvider.verifyAccessToken populates AuthInfo.sourceId from oauth_clients.source_id. JOIN guarded by isUndefinedColumnError so pre-v55 brains degrade to legacy projection rather than refusing every token verification. - GBrainOAuthProvider.registerClientManual gains a sourceId parameter (defaults to 'default'). DCR registerClient also sets source_id='default' on the inserted row. - serve-http.ts:929 cleanup: AuthInfo.sourceId is now a real typed field. The cast + GBRAIN_SOURCE env fallback chain is gone (D13). Legacy bearer tokens default to 'default' source in verifyAccessToken. - http-transport.ts (legacy access_tokens path) threads sourceId='default' through DispatchOpts so v0.22.7 callers stay source-scoped. - auth.ts CLI adds --source flag to gbrain auth register-client. Migration v55 (D10 + D13): - ALTER TABLE oauth_clients ADD COLUMN source_id TEXT (nullable). - Backfill UPDATE source_id = 'default' WHERE source_id IS NULL — preserves v0.33 effective behavior verbatim for legacy clients. - ADD CONSTRAINT FK ... REFERENCES sources(id) ON DELETE SET NULL, wrapped in DO block so re-runs against fresh-install brains (where the FK already lives inline in SCHEMA_SQL) no-op cleanly. - CREATE INDEX idx_oauth_clients_source_id WHERE source_id IS NOT NULL for the verifyAccessToken JOIN. - GBRAIN_ACCEPT_SILENT_WIDEN env-flag wired through the runner via SET LOCAL gbrain.accept_silent_widen — reserved for future migrations that hit the silent-widen footgun codex flagged. This migration doesn't need it (column is brand new; no pre-existing stale values possible by definition). - src/core/pglite-schema.ts + src/schema.sql include the column + FK + index inline for fresh installs. Tests: new test/e2e/source-isolation-pglite.test.ts with 13 regression cases — one per leak surface (search/list_pages/traverse/etc.) plus explicit AuthInfo.sourceId and AuthInfo.allowedSources op-handler threading checks. Full unit suite: 6034 pass / 0 fail. PGLite initSchema time dropped from 2.4s to 850ms after consolidating v55's DO blocks (multiple DO blocks were slow on PGLite; one DO block for the FK install only is fine). Origin: PR #861 + plan-eng-review decisions D2/D3/D4/D9/D10/D13 + F2. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(gateway): multimodal embedding for openai-compatible providers Pre-fix, embedMultimodal hardcoded a recipe.id === 'voyage' branch and threw AIConfigError for every other recipe. Multimodal-capable providers fronted by LiteLLM (or any openai-compatible proxy) were unreachable even when the operator had wired up the model. The fix: - src/core/ai/gateway.ts adds embedMultimodalOpenAICompat() that POSTs to the standard /embeddings endpoint with content arrays carrying image_url entries. Routing comes from the existing recipe.implementation switch — Voyage stays on its own /multimodalembeddings path; every other openai-compatible recipe flows through the new helper. - src/core/ai/recipes/litellm-proxy.ts declares supports_multimodal: true so embedMultimodal accepts the recipe. No multimodal_models allow-list: LiteLLM is a passthrough proxy and the user owns model-id selection; provider rejection (400 from upstream) is the right enforcement layer there. Voyage's static allow-list shape stays unchanged (its 12 models share supports_multimodal but only one is multimodal-capable). - D12 runtime dimension validation: the new helper checks the returned vector length against the recipe's declared default_dims (preferred) or the brain's embedding_dimensions config. Mismatch throws AIConfigError with model id + observed + expected so the operator can swap models or rebuild the column. Pre-fix, a wrong-dim response would surface as a cryptic pgvector "vector dimension mismatch" at INSERT time. - Auth resolution routes through the existing defaultResolveAuth helper so optional-auth recipes (LiteLLM proxy with no LITELLM_API_KEY) and required-auth recipes both share one code path. Optional-auth sends "Authorization: Bearer unauthenticated" which servers like Ollama / llama-server ignore but the SDK contract requires. Tests: 11 new cases in test/openai-compat-multimodal.test.ts cover happy-path, multi-input batching, unauthenticated proxy, D12 dim mismatch + default-dim fallback, 401 / 400 / malformed-JSON / non-array error paths, and an explicit Voyage-regression test pinning that the new openai-compat route doesn't accidentally hijack the Voyage path. All 41 multimodal-related tests pass (existing voyage suite + new). typecheck clean. Origin: PR #875 + plan-eng-review D12 (runtime dim validation). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(oauth): federated_read read scope (#876) Pre-fix, OAuth clients had a single source-scope axis (source_id, added in v55). A client could either write+read one source OR be a super-reader across all sources (via NULL source_id). There was no middle ground — WeCare-style L3 dept clients that need to write to dept-x but read dept-x + parent canon + shared canon had no expression. #876 adds federated_read TEXT[] as an orthogonal read-scope axis. source_id is the WRITE authority; federated_read is the READ authority. They default to matching values (read scope == write scope, the pre-v0.34 default) when a client is registered without an explicit federated read list. Migrations v56-v60 (six new migrations on top of v55): - v56: ALTER TABLE ... ADD COLUMN federated_read TEXT[] NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'. - v57 (F5): explicit CASE backfill so source_id IS NULL → '{}' (not an array containing NULL — codex caught this ambiguity during plan review). - v58: post-backfill validation. Fails loud if any row's source_id isn't in its federated_read array, pointing at a logic bug in v57 if fired. - v59: flip the source_id FK from ON DELETE SET NULL to ON DELETE RESTRICT now that federated_read provides the alternative scope-loss path. Pre-flip, deleting a source could silently widen any oauth_client to super-reader; post-flip, source delete is refused if any client references it (operator must revoke/re-scope first). - v60: GIN index on federated_read for array-containment queries. Auth wiring: - GBrainOAuthProvider.verifyAccessToken JOINs c.federated_read and populates AuthInfo.allowedSources. Pre-v56 / pre-v55 brains degrade via the existing isUndefinedColumnError fallback chain. - registerClientManual gains a federatedRead?: string[] parameter (defaults to [sourceId]). - DCR registerClient sets source_id='default' + federated_read=['default'] on the inserted row. - auth.ts CLI adds --federated-read SRC1,SRC2,... flag. The register-client output now prints "Federated reads:" so operators confirm the scope they set. Engines consume the federated array through the SearchOpts.sourceIds / PageFilters.sourceIds field that #861 added (no engine changes here — the plumbing was D9). sourceScopeOpts in operations.ts already prefers the auth.allowedSources array over scalar ctx.sourceId when set. Test seam: - test/book-mirror.test.ts now spawns the CLI with GBRAIN_HOME pointed at a tempdir so the test isn't sensitive to the developer's local ~/.gbrain/config.json. Pre-fix the test could silently inherit a real Postgres connection and hang past the default 5s test timeout. Fresh GBRAIN_HOME → "No brain configured" → exit 1 in <1s. - test/e2e/source-isolation-pglite.test.ts gains one more regression case: AuthInfo.allowedSources = [] (explicit empty) MUST NOT widen scope to "all sources" — the silent-widen footgun precedence ladder. - test/openai-compat-multimodal.test.ts is part of the wave's commits via the migrate.ts changes that bump the schema chain. typecheck-only fix on a captured-auth type was already in #875's tree. 6045 unit tests pass / 0 fail. typecheck clean. PGLite initSchema runs v55-v60 in ~786ms total (within the test-harness budget for tests using the canonical beforeAll engine pattern). Origin: PR #876 + plan-eng-review F5 (CASE backfill). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * v0.34.0.0: MCP fix wave (#870 #909 #864 #861 #875 #876) VERSION + package.json + CHANGELOG bump for the six-PR MCP fix wave. Schema chain extends from v54 → v60; oauth_clients gains source_id + federated_read columns; auth'd MCP clients now stay inside their scope across all read-side ops; PKCE-only DCR works; --bind defaults to loopback; LiteLLM multimodal embedding ships. Contributed by @Hansen1018 (#870), @ding-modding (#909), @DukeDawg (#864), @toilalesondev (#861 + #876), @yoelgal (#875). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: update project documentation for v0.34.0.0 Sync README, CLAUDE.md, SECURITY.md, docs/architecture/topologies.md, and docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md to reflect the v0.34.0.0 MCP fix wave: - README: document --bind HOST default (loopback), --source + --federated-read register-client flags, PKCE public-client gate - SECURITY.md: note loopback-by-default for serve --http, update the trust-proxy contract to point at the new default - CLAUDE.md: annotate operations.ts (sourceScopeOpts helper), oauth-provider.ts (verifyAccessToken JOIN + PKCE public clients), serve-http.ts (--bind flag), gateway.ts (openai-compat multimodal + dim validation), mcp/server.ts (MCP_STDIO guard), auth.ts (--source + --federated-read), migrate.ts (v58-v63 chain), engine.ts (sourceIds field). Add 4 new test-file entries for source-isolation-pglite, openai-compat-multimodal, serve-stdio-lifecycle, oauth.test.ts PKCE cases - docs/architecture/topologies.md: source-scoped register-client example, --bind 0.0.0.0 for thin-client host setup - docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md: --bind explanation in the ngrok section, source-scoped client recipe - llms-full.txt: regenerated per the CLAUDE.md-edit chaser rule Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump v0.34.0.0 → v0.34.1.0 Renumbering the MCP fix wave from v0.34.0.0 to v0.34.1.0 so the release slot lands between master's v0.33.2.1 and the next minor. Touches every release-artifact mention: - VERSION: 0.34.0.0 → 0.34.1.0 - package.json: same - CHANGELOG.md header + "To take advantage" block - CLAUDE.md key-files annotations (8 entries that document this wave) - llms-full.txt (regen from CLAUDE.md) - README.md / SECURITY.md / docs/architecture/topologies.md / docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md - Wave code-comment markers ("// v0.34.0 (#NNN):" → "// v0.34.1 (#NNN):") Test files renamed alongside since they were committed with the wave. Commit subjects on the original 6 PR commits + the v0.34.0.0 bump commit (4f533c72 → 6b47db7e) intentionally NOT rewritten — those are history. `git log` finds the implementation by message subject, not by version tag. 6275 unit tests pass, typecheck clean, migration chain v58-v63 unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
368 lines
15 KiB
Markdown
368 lines
15 KiB
Markdown
# GBrain Deployment Topologies
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GBrain supports three deployment shapes. They compose: a single user can mix
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all three on the same machine without conflict, because every shape resolves
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to "which `~/.gbrain/config.json` is active right now?" and `GBRAIN_HOME`
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controls that selection.
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This page covers the three topologies, when each fits, and concrete setup
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recipes. Pair this doc with `docs/architecture/brains-and-sources.md` (which
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covers the in-brain organization axes) — that doc is about WHICH database;
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this doc is about WHERE that database lives.
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## Quick decision tree
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```
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"I'm setting up gbrain..."
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│
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▼
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Just for me, on one machine? ─── yes ───▶ Topology 1 (single brain)
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│
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no
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│
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▼
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Will a remote machine host the brain
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while my agent runs locally? ──── yes ───▶ Topology 2 (cross-machine thin client)
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│
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no
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│
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▼
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Multiple Conductor worktrees that
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shouldn't share a code index? ─── yes ───▶ Topology 3 (split-engine)
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```
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Topologies 2 and 3 stack: a thin-client install can also host per-worktree
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code engines, and a per-worktree code engine can also point its artifact
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brain at a remote server.
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## Topology 1 — Single brain (today's default)
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```
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┌────────────────┐
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│ one machine │
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│ ┌──────────┐ │
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│ │ gbrain │──┼──→ ~/.gbrain/ → PGLite or Supabase
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│ │ CLI │ │
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│ └──────────┘ │
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└────────────────┘
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```
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What you get: one local DB (PGLite for small brains, Supabase for ~1000+
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files). All commands work directly against it. `gbrain serve` exposes it
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to a single agent over MCP.
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When it fits: solo use, single machine, one agent, no Conductor parallelism.
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This is the default; `gbrain init` (no flags) gives you this.
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Setup:
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```
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gbrain init # interactive — defaults to PGLite
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gbrain init --pglite # explicit local
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gbrain init --supabase # remote Supabase (recommended for 1000+ files)
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```
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Nothing else here is special. The other two topologies are variations on
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"who owns the DB" and "how does the agent talk to it."
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## Topology 2 — Cross-machine thin client
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```
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┌────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐
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│ neuromancer│ │ brain-host │
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│ ┌────────┐ │ HTTP MCP / OAuth │ ┌────────────┐ │
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│ │ Hermes │─┼───────────────────→│ │ gbrain │──┼──→ Supabase
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│ │ agent │ │ │ │ serve --http│ │
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│ └────────┘ │ │ └────────────┘ │
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│ │ │ (with autopilot)│
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│ no local │ │ │
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│ gbrain DB │ │ │
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└────────────┘ └──────────────────┘
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```
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What you get: the agent on one machine ("neuromancer") consumes a brain
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hosted on another machine ("brain-host") over HTTP MCP with OAuth. The
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agent's machine has NO local engine. All queries, searches, embeddings,
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and indexing happen on the host.
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When it fits:
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- Heavy brain (Supabase + autopilot) lives on a beefy machine; agents
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elsewhere just consume it.
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- You want one source of truth across many machines.
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- Spinning up a parallel local install would create source-ID contention or
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duplicate work.
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The thin client's `~/.gbrain/config.json` carries a `remote_mcp` field
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instead of a local DB connection:
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```jsonc
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{
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"engine": "postgres", // ignored — never used
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"remote_mcp": {
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"issuer_url": "https://brain-host.local:3001",
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"mcp_url": "https://brain-host.local:3001/mcp",
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"oauth_client_id": "neuromancer-...",
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"oauth_client_secret": "..." // or set GBRAIN_REMOTE_CLIENT_SECRET
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}
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}
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```
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The CLI dispatch guard refuses any DB-bound command (`sync`, `embed`,
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`extract`, `migrate`, `apply-migrations`, `repair-jsonb`, `orphans`,
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`integrity`, `serve`) on a thin-client install with a clear error pointing
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at the remote host. `gbrain doctor` runs a dedicated thin-client check set
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(OAuth discovery, token round-trip, MCP smoke).
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### Setup
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**Step 1 — On the host (brain-host):**
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```bash
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gbrain init --supabase # or --pglite, doesn't matter
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gbrain serve --http --port 3001 --bind 0.0.0.0 # v0.34: bind explicitly for remote access
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# (defaults to 127.0.0.1 since v0.34)
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gbrain auth register-client neuromancer \
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--grant-types client_credentials \
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--scopes read,write,admin # admin needed for ping/doctor
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# v0.34: source-scoped client (write to one source, federate reads across
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# multiple sources). Omit both flags for a v0.33-compatible super-client.
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gbrain auth register-client neuromancer-dept \
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--grant-types client_credentials \
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--scopes read,write \
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--source dept-x \
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--federated-read dept-x,shared,parent-canon
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```
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The `register-client` command prints a `client_id` and `client_secret`.
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Note both. **Scope must include `admin`** — `submit_job` (used by
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`gbrain remote ping`) and `run_doctor` (used by `gbrain remote doctor`)
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both require it.
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**Step 2 — On the thin client (neuromancer):**
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```bash
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gbrain init --mcp-only \
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--issuer-url https://brain-host.local:3001 \
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--mcp-url https://brain-host.local:3001/mcp \
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--oauth-client-id <id> \
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--oauth-client-secret <secret>
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```
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Pre-flight smoke runs three probes (OAuth discovery, token round-trip,
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MCP initialize). If any fails, init exits with an actionable error. On
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success, `~/.gbrain/config.json` gets `remote_mcp` set and NO local DB
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is created.
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**Step 3 — Configure your agent's MCP client.**
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For Claude Desktop / Hermes / openclaw, add a single MCP server entry
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pointing at the host's `mcp_url` with the bearer token from `register-client`.
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Example for Claude Desktop's `~/.config/claude/claude_desktop_config.json`:
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```jsonc
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{
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"mcpServers": {
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"gbrain": {
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"type": "url",
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"url": "https://brain-host.local:3001/mcp",
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"headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer <client_secret>" }
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}
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}
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}
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```
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**Step 4 — Verify.**
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```bash
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gbrain doctor # runs thin-client checks (no local DB needed)
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gbrain remote ping # triggers an autopilot cycle on the host (Tier B)
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gbrain remote doctor # asks the host to run its own doctor (Tier B)
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```
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`gbrain sync` and friends will refuse with a clear thin-client error
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naming the `mcp_url`. That's the correct behavior — those commands need
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a local engine that doesn't exist here.
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### Re-run guard
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Running `gbrain init` (no flags) on a machine that already has thin-client
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config set refuses without `--force`. This catches the scripted-setup-loop
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friction where an orchestrator keeps trying to create a local DB. Use
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`gbrain init --mcp-only --force` to refresh thin-client config.
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### Storing the OAuth secret
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Three storage paths in priority order:
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1. **`GBRAIN_REMOTE_CLIENT_SECRET` env var** (preferred for headless agents).
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When set, overrides whatever's in the config file. The init flow doesn't
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persist a config-file copy when the env var was the source.
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2. **`~/.gbrain/config.json` with 0600 perms** (default for interactive
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setup; mirrors how Supabase keys are stored today).
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3. macOS Keychain integration is on the roadmap; not in v1.
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## Topology 3 — Split-engine, per-worktree code + remote artifacts
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```
|
|
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
|
|
│ one machine │
|
|
│ │
|
|
│ ┌─ worktree A ──────────────┐ │
|
|
│ │ GBRAIN_HOME=A/.conductor │ │
|
|
│ │ gbrain serve --port 3001 │── PGLite (code A) │
|
|
│ └───────────────────────────┘ │
|
|
│ │
|
|
│ ┌─ worktree B ──────────────┐ │
|
|
│ │ GBRAIN_HOME=B/.conductor │ │
|
|
│ │ gbrain serve --port 3002 │── PGLite (code B) │
|
|
│ └───────────────────────────┘ │
|
|
│ │
|
|
│ ┌─ default ~/.gbrain ───────┐ HTTP MCP / OAuth │
|
|
│ │ gbrain serve --port 3000 │──────────────────────→ remote artifacts
|
|
│ └───────────────────────────┘ (Supabase / brain-host)
|
|
│ │
|
|
│ Agent's MCP config (Hermes / Claude Desktop): │
|
|
│ mcp__gbrain_code__* → http://localhost:3001 │
|
|
│ mcp__gbrain_artifacts__* → http://brain-host/mcp │
|
|
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
What you get: each Conductor worktree has its own per-worktree code index
|
|
(local PGLite, disposable when the worktree dies). Artifacts (plans,
|
|
learnings, transcripts) still live in a shared brain that all worktrees
|
|
can see and write to.
|
|
|
|
When it fits:
|
|
|
|
- Multiple Conductor worktrees on one machine, all touching the same code
|
|
repo.
|
|
- You don't want each worktree's code-import to clobber the others'
|
|
`last_commit`, source IDs, or symbol tables.
|
|
- You DO want artifacts (plans, learnings, retros, transcripts) to be
|
|
visible across worktrees.
|
|
|
|
### How it works
|
|
|
|
`GBRAIN_HOME` selects which `~/.gbrain` directory is active. Set per worktree:
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
export GBRAIN_HOME=/path/to/worktree-A/.conductor/gbrain
|
|
gbrain init --pglite
|
|
gbrain serve --http --port 3001
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
Each worktree's `gbrain serve` instance binds its own port and indexes its
|
|
own DB. Multiple `gbrain serve` processes coexist fine — they're separate
|
|
OS processes with separate config and separate connection pools.
|
|
|
|
The artifact brain runs as a separate `gbrain serve` instance with the
|
|
default `~/.gbrain` (no GBRAIN_HOME override) — or remote, in which case
|
|
it's a Topology 2 setup.
|
|
|
|
The agent's MCP client config lists multiple servers, each with a unique
|
|
alias. Tool names are namespaced as `mcp__<alias>__<tool>`, so the agent
|
|
calls `mcp__gbrain_code__search` for code lookups and `mcp__gbrain_artifacts__search`
|
|
for artifact lookups.
|
|
|
|
### CRITICAL: alias-level routing is manual
|
|
|
|
Topology 3 has no smart per-tool routing inside gbrain. The agent picks
|
|
which brain to query when it picks the alias. **A wrong alias writes (or
|
|
queries) the wrong brain silently.** This is intentional (explicit beats
|
|
magic) but real:
|
|
|
|
- If the agent calls `mcp__gbrain_artifacts__put_page` with code-shaped
|
|
content, that page lands in the artifact brain forever.
|
|
- If the agent calls `mcp__gbrain_code__search` for a question that
|
|
actually wants artifact context, the search comes back empty.
|
|
|
|
Mitigations:
|
|
|
|
- Name aliases clearly. `gbrain_code` vs `gbrain_artifacts` is unambiguous;
|
|
`gbrain` vs `gbrain_local` is not.
|
|
- Document in your agent's system prompt or rules which alias goes where.
|
|
Be explicit about "code questions → `gbrain_code`; everything else →
|
|
`gbrain_artifacts`."
|
|
- Pair Topology 3 with `gstack`'s per-worktree wiring (which sets the
|
|
alias names + agent rules consistently across worktrees).
|
|
|
|
### Setup (manual; gstack automates this side)
|
|
|
|
The gbrain side requires zero new code — `GBRAIN_HOME` and `--port` already
|
|
exist. Setup looks like:
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
# Start the artifact brain (default ~/.gbrain) on port 3000
|
|
gbrain serve --http --port 3000 &
|
|
|
|
# Start a per-worktree code brain on port 3001
|
|
export GBRAIN_HOME=/path/to/worktree-A/.conductor/gbrain
|
|
gbrain init --pglite
|
|
gbrain serve --http --port 3001 &
|
|
unset GBRAIN_HOME
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
Then configure the agent's MCP config with two entries (different aliases,
|
|
different ports). For Claude Desktop:
|
|
|
|
```jsonc
|
|
{
|
|
"mcpServers": {
|
|
"gbrain_artifacts": {
|
|
"type": "url",
|
|
"url": "http://localhost:3000/mcp",
|
|
"headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer <token-A>" }
|
|
},
|
|
"gbrain_code": {
|
|
"type": "url",
|
|
"url": "http://localhost:3001/mcp",
|
|
"headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer <token-B>" }
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
The gstack-side wiring (per-worktree home setup, port allocation, automatic
|
|
MCP config generation, gitignore for the per-worktree DB) is in the gstack
|
|
repo's setup-gbrain skill — it composes these primitives, gbrain doesn't
|
|
have to know about Conductor.
|
|
|
|
## Combining topologies
|
|
|
|
The three shapes compose. A single machine can run:
|
|
|
|
- A thin-client default config pointing at a remote artifact brain
|
|
(Topology 2).
|
|
- Plus per-worktree code brains under their own `GBRAIN_HOME` (Topology 3).
|
|
- Each worktree's `gbrain serve` instance is local; the agent's MCP config
|
|
lists them alongside the remote artifact brain.
|
|
|
|
`GBRAIN_HOME` controls which config file is active for any one CLI
|
|
invocation. `gbrain serve --port` controls which port a server listens on.
|
|
The agent's MCP client picks the alias and thus the destination per tool
|
|
call. There's no global gbrain orchestrator that knows about all of them
|
|
simultaneously — that's by design.
|
|
|
|
## When NOT to use these topologies
|
|
|
|
- **Don't use Topology 2 if your agent only ever runs on the same machine
|
|
as the brain.** A local `gbrain` install + `gbrain serve` (stdio) is
|
|
simpler and faster.
|
|
- **Don't use Topology 3 if you only have one Conductor worktree at a
|
|
time.** Per-worktree engines exist to prevent contention; one-at-a-time
|
|
use has no contention.
|
|
- **Don't use a `remote_mcp` thin client AND a local engine on the same
|
|
machine in the same `GBRAIN_HOME`.** The dispatch guard refuses DB-bound
|
|
commands when `remote_mcp` is set. If you genuinely want both modes on
|
|
one machine, use `GBRAIN_HOME` to separate them (one home for the thin
|
|
client, another for the local engine).
|
|
|
|
## See also
|
|
|
|
- `docs/architecture/brains-and-sources.md` — in-brain organization (brains
|
|
vs sources axes).
|
|
- `docs/mcp/CLAUDE_DESKTOP.md` and siblings — per-client MCP setup.
|
|
- `gbrain init --help` and `gbrain auth --help` for command-level details.
|