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Author SHA1 Message Date
Garry Tan
d3b52edeba v0.22.7 fix: built-in HTTP transport with bearer auth for remote MCP (#483) 
* fix: add built-in HTTP transport with bearer auth for remote MCP

Adds `gbrain serve --http` with token-based authentication using the
existing access_tokens table. Eliminates the need for standalone OAuth
wrappers that may have insecure open registration endpoints.

- New: src/mcp/http-transport.ts — HTTP+SSE transport with bearer auth
- New: SECURITY.md — security advisory for remote MCP deployments
- Updated: serve command accepts --http and --port flags
- Updated: DEPLOY.md recommends --http for remote access
- Bump: 0.22.4 → 0.22.5

* chore: extract shared MCP dispatch + rate-limit modules

dispatch.ts is the single source of truth for stdio + HTTP transport: validateParams,
OperationContext build, handler invocation, error formatting. Server.ts refactored to
use it. Prevents the F1-F3 transport-drift bugs where stdio and HTTP independently
implemented dispatch logic differently (reversed args, missing context fields, no
param validation).

rate-limit.ts: bounded-LRU token-bucket. Tracks lastTouchedMs separately from
lastRefillMs so an exhausted key can't be reset by hammering past the TTL.

* feat: HTTP transport hardening + F1-F3 dispatch bug fixes

Rewrite of src/mcp/http-transport.ts on top of the new dispatch.ts and rate-limit.ts:

- F1 fix: dispatch via shared dispatchToolCall(ctx, params) — was reversed args
  (params, ctx) before, would have crashed every real tools/call.
- F2 fix: full OperationContext (engine, config, logger, dryRun, remote) — was
  only {engine, remote: true} before.
- F3 fix: validateParams runs on HTTP path — was skipped before.
- Engine.kind fail-fast: clear error message on PGLite (access_tokens table is
  Postgres-only by design).
- CORS: default-deny via GBRAIN_HTTP_CORS_ORIGIN allowlist.
- Body cap: stream-counted via req.body reader, catches chunked transfers
  without Content-Length. Default 1 MiB via GBRAIN_HTTP_MAX_BODY_BYTES.
- Rate limit: pre-auth IP bucket fires BEFORE DB lookup (limits brute-force
  load), post-auth token-id bucket fires after auth (limits runaway clients).
  Both bounded LRU with TTL prune.
- mcp_request_log: per-request audit row reusing the existing schema (v4).
- last_used_at SQL-level debounce: WHERE last_used_at < now() - interval
  '60 seconds'. Race-tolerant under PgBouncer.
- Response shape: application/json (gbrain MCP tools don't stream).
  Streamable-HTTP transport spec compliant for non-streaming responses.
- X-Forwarded-For honored only when GBRAIN_HTTP_TRUST_PROXY=1.

* feat: wire gbrain auth into the main CLI

The original PR's docs referenced 'gbrain auth create/list/revoke' but auth.ts
was a standalone script never wired to the CLI dispatcher. Running 'gbrain auth'
from the compiled binary returned 'Unknown command'.

- auth.ts: extract the dispatch into runAuth(args) + import.meta.main guard
  so direct-script invocation still works (bun run src/commands/auth.ts ...).
- cli.ts: add 'auth' to CLI_ONLY set + handler in handleCliOnly that imports
  runAuth and dispatches without requiring an engine connection (auth.ts
  manages its own postgres() connection).

* test: HTTP transport unit + E2E coverage (23 + 8 cases)

test/http-transport.test.ts — 23 unit cases against mocked engine.sql:
  - Auth: valid/missing/no-Bearer/unknown/revoked/health-bypass (1-6)
  - F1+F2 round-trip via dispatch.ts (7) — regression guard for reversed args
  - F3 invalid_params via validateParams (8) — regression guard
  - Response Content-Type application/json, not SSE (9)
  - CORS default-deny + allowlist + non-match (10-12)
  - Body cap: Content-Length + chunked-transfer (13-14)
  - Rate limit: refill, exhaust+Retry-After, LRU eviction, TTL prune,
    pre-auth IP fires before DB, /health bypasses (15-20)
  - mcp_request_log audit: success row + auth_failed row (21-22)

test/e2e/http-transport.test.ts — 8 cases against real Postgres:
  - /health, tools/list, tools/call list_pages (real op round-trip),
    revoked → 401, last_used_at debounce within 60s (asserts ONE update),
    debounce 65s gap (asserts TWO updates), mcp_request_log row check,
    invalid_params via real handler.

* docs: v0.22.7 CHANGELOG + SECURITY.md + DEPLOY.md

CHANGELOG: v0.22.7 release notes covering the F1-F3 dispatch fixes, the full
hardening surface (CORS default-deny, two-bucket rate limit, body cap, audit
log), and the upgrade path. Master's v0.22.6 schema-verify entry stitched in
above (preserving merge ordering).

SECURITY.md: full hardening reference for gbrain serve --http — Postgres-only
caveat, CORS allowlist, rate limit + tunnel caveat, body cap, audit log query,
GBRAIN_HTTP_TRUST_PROXY warning.

docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md: Postgres-only call-out, env var summary, fail-fast behavior
on PGLite.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: codex review follow-ups (DB-probing /health + XFF trust safety contract)

- /health now does SELECT 1 against Postgres and returns 503 + status:unhealthy
  when the DB is unreachable. Prevents the failure mode where orchestration
  sees green pods while clients get misleading 401s during a DB outage.
- SECURITY.md: tighten the GBRAIN_HTTP_TRUST_PROXY=1 guidance with the explicit
  two-condition safety contract — gbrain bound to a private interface AND the
  proxy strips client-supplied XFF. Without both, the flag enables IP spoofing
  past the pre-auth rate limit.
- Tests: add 6b (/health DB-down → 503) + assert db:'ok' on the happy path.

Caught by codex adversarial review during /ship Step 11.

* docs: TODOS.md — v0.22.7 follow-ups (audit volume, validateParams enums, SSE, scopes)

* docs: update project documentation for v0.22.7

CLAUDE.md: document src/mcp/dispatch.ts, src/mcp/rate-limit.ts, and the
rewritten src/mcp/http-transport.ts in the Key files section. Add
test/http-transport.test.ts (23 unit cases) and test/e2e/http-transport.test.ts
(8 E2E cases) to the test inventories.

CHANGELOG.md: fix copy-paste version mismatches inside the v0.22.7 entry that
referenced v0.22.5 (header line + "To take advantage of" block).

README.md: replace the standalone bun-run auth invocation with the wired-in
gbrain auth CLI; add gbrain serve --http startup step to the Remote MCP
example; surface gbrain auth in the admin command list; link SECURITY.md
from the Remote MCP section so it's discoverable.

SECURITY.md: align "as of v0.22.5" callouts with the actual release version
(v0.22.7).

docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md: align v0.22.5+ callout with v0.22.7+; switch token-management
examples from `bun run src/commands/auth.ts` to `gbrain auth` now that auth is
in the main CLI.

docs/mcp/ALTERNATIVES.md: drop the "planned but not yet implemented" note for
gbrain serve --http; document that the built-in HTTP transport is the
recommended path.

docs/mcp/{CLAUDE_DESKTOP,CLAUDE_COWORK,CLAUDE_CODE,PERPLEXITY}.md: switch
token-creation examples from `bun run src/commands/auth.ts create` to
`gbrain auth create` to match the wired-in CLI.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: typecheck — cast CallToolRequestSchema handler return to any

MCP SDK 1.29 widened the response type for setRequestHandler(CallToolRequestSchema, ...)
to require a 'task' field for managed-task responses. gbrain ops are synchronous and
return the legacy { content, isError? } shape, which is still valid via the SDK's
ServerResult union. Casting the handler return type to any silences the narrowing
that broke after dispatch.ts was extracted (the original inline handler dodged this
because TypeScript inferred its return as any from the function body).

CI failure: src/mcp/server.ts(25,51): error TS2345 — Property 'task' is missing in
type 'ToolResult' but required in type '{ ...; task: { taskId: string; ... }; ... }'.
Caught by the 'test' job's bun run typecheck step at PR #483 commit 65ea9e7.

* docs: regenerate llms-full.txt after master merge

The build-llms regen-drift guard fails when committed llms.txt + llms-full.txt
don't match what scripts/build-llms.ts produces from current source. Master's
v0.22.6.1 merge brought in new content (CLAUDE.md entries, CHANGELOG, etc.)
that hadn't been folded into the bundle. Running 'bun run build:llms' to sync.

llms.txt unchanged; llms-full.txt picks up the new entries.

* docs: CHANGELOG — scrub attack-surface enumeration from v0.22.7 entry

Per CLAUDE.md responsible-disclosure rule: 'when a release fixes a security
gap or a user-impacting bug, describe the fix functionally. Do not enumerate
the attack surface, quantify the exposure window, or highlight the most
sensitive records by name in public-facing artifacts.'

Removed:
- Lead-paragraph attack-chain ('attacker who discovers URL → POST /register
  → client_credentials → read entire brain'). Public-doc readers don't need
  the directed probe path.
- 'Bug fixes folded in' section that itemized prior-version failure modes.
  Reframed as a 'transport refactor' note in the For Contributors section,
  describing the dispatch consolidation functionally without claiming the
  prior version was broken in specific ways.
- 'Without the OAuth footgun' lead headline. The fix's mechanism (built-in
  bearer auth via access_tokens) is already self-evident from the headline.
- F1/F2/F3 internal labels and 'caught by codex outside-voice during
  planning' parenthetical.

Kept:
- The full hardening reference table (configuration / behavior, not exposure).
- 'gbrain serve --http' user-facing operator ergonomics.
- 'Postgres-only by design' known-limit framing.
- Dispatch consolidation as a contributor-facing single-source-of-truth note.

SECURITY.md left intact: its OAuth-deployment guidance is generic 'if you
deploy MCP behind a custom HTTP wrapper, here are the rules' framing, not
gbrain-version-specific exposure. That's defensible under the same rule.

* docs: SECURITY.md — drop unverified security@garrytan.com address

The address was in the original PR's SECURITY.md commit (6e740590, author
'root <root@localhost>' — machine-generated) and never verified to exist or
forward anywhere. A non-monitored disclosure address is worse than no address
at all: reports go to a black hole.

Keep the GitHub private security advisory link as the sole disclosure channel.
GitHub Security Advisories is the working path most researchers reach for
first anyway — restricted-access by default, scopes the conversation to
maintainers, and integrates with CVE issuance when needed.

---------

Co-authored-by: root <root@localhost>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-28 17:01:40 -07:00
Garry Tan
7bbfc3e36a security: fix wave 3 — 9 vulns (file_upload, SSRF, recipe trust, prompt injection) (#174) 
* feat(engine): add cap parameter to clampSearchLimit (H6)

clampSearchLimit(limit, defaultLimit, cap = MAX_SEARCH_LIMIT) — third arg
is a caller-specified cap so operation handlers can enforce limits below
MAX_SEARCH_LIMIT. Backward compatible: existing two-arg callers still cap
at MAX_SEARCH_LIMIT.

This fixes a Codex-caught semantics bug: the prior signature took (limit,
defaultLimit) where the second arg was misread as a cap. clampSearchLimit(x, 20)
was actually allowing values up to 100, not 20.

* feat(integrations): SSRF defense + recipe trust boundary (B1, B2, Fix 2, Fix 4, B3, B4)

- B1: split loadAllRecipes into trusted (package-bundled) and untrusted
  (cwd/recipes, $GBRAIN_RECIPES_DIR) tiers. Only package-bundled recipes
  get embedded=true. Closes the fake trust boundary that let any cwd-local
  recipe bypass health-check gates.
- B2: hard-block string health_checks for non-embedded recipes (was previously
  only blocked when isUnsafeHealthCheck regex matched, which the cwd recipe
  exploit bypassed). Embedded recipes still get the regex defense.
- Fix 2: gate command DSL health_checks on isEmbedded. Non-embedded
  recipes cannot spawnSync.
- Fix 4 + B3 + B4: gate http DSL health_checks on isEmbedded; for embedded
  recipes, validate URLs via new isInternalUrl() before fetch:
  - Scheme allowlist (http/https only): blocks file:, data:, blob:, ftp:, javascript:
  - IPv4 range check covering hex/octal/decimal/single-integer bypass forms
  - IPv6 loopback ::1 + IPv4-mapped ::ffff: (canonicalized hex hextets handled)
  - Metadata hostnames (AWS, GCP, instance-data) blocked
  - fetch with redirect: 'manual' + per-hop re-validation up to 3 hops

Original PRs #105-109 by @garagon. Wave 3 collector branch reimplemented
the fixes after Codex outside-voice review found that PRs #106/#108 alone
did not actually gate cwd-local recipes (B1) and that PR #108 missed
redirect-following SSRF (B3) and non-http schemes (B4).

* feat(file_upload): path/slug/filename validation + remote-caller confinement (Fix 1, B5, H5, M4, Fix 5)

- Fix 1 + B5 + H1: validateUploadPath uses realpathSync + path.relative
  to defeat symlink-parent traversal. lstatSync alone (the original PR #105
  approach) only catches final-component symlinks; a symlinked parent dir
  still followed to /etc/passwd. Now the entire path chain is resolved.
- H5: validatePageSlug uses an allowlist regex (alphanumeric + hyphens,
  slash-separated segments). Closes URL-encoded traversal (%2e%2e%2f),
  Unicode lookalikes, backslashes, control chars implicitly.
- M4: validateFilename allowlist regex. Rejects control chars, backslash,
  RTL override (\u202E), leading dot/dash. Filename flows into storage_path
  so this matters for every storage backend.
- Fix 5: clamp list_pages and get_ingest_log limits at the operation layer
  via new clampSearchLimit cap parameter (list_pages caps at 100,
  get_ingest_log at 50). Internal bulk commands bypass the operation
  layer and remain uncapped.
- New OperationContext.remote flag distinguishes trusted local CLI from
  untrusted MCP callers. file_upload uses strict cwd confinement when
  remote=true (default), loose mode when remote=false (CLI). MCP stdio
  server sets remote=true; cli.ts and handleToolCall (gbrain call) set
  remote=false.

Original PR #105 by @garagon. Issue #139 reported by @Hybirdss.

* feat(search): query sanitization + structural prompt boundary (Fix 3, M1, M2, M3)

- M1: restructure callHaikuForExpansion to use a system message that declares
  the user query as untrusted data, plus an XML-tagged <user_query> boundary
  in the user message. Layered defense with the existing tool_choice constraint
  (3 layers vs 1).
- Fix 3 (regex sanitizer, defense-in-depth): sanitizeQueryForPrompt strips
  triple-backtick code fences, XML/HTML tags, leading injection prefixes,
  and caps at 500 chars. Original query is still used for downstream search;
  only the LLM-facing copy is sanitized.
- M2: sanitizeExpansionOutput validates the model's alternative_queries array
  before it flows into search. Strips control chars, caps length, dedupes
  case-insensitively, drops empty/non-string items, caps to 2 items.
- M3: console.warn on stripped content NEVER logs the query text — privacy-safe
  debug signal only.

Original PR #107 by @garagon. M1/M2/M3 are wave 3 hardening per Codex review.

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.10.2)

Security wave 3: 9 vulnerabilities closed across file_upload, recipe trust
boundary, SSRF defense, prompt injection, and limit clamping. See CHANGELOG
for full details.

Contributors:
- @garagon (PRs #105-109)
- @Hybirdss (Issue #139)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: sync documentation with v0.10.2 security wave 3

- CLAUDE.md: document OperationContext.remote, new security helpers
  (validateUploadPath, validatePageSlug, validateFilename, isInternalUrl,
  parseOctet, hostnameToOctets, isPrivateIpv4, getRecipeDirs,
  sanitizeQueryForPrompt, sanitizeExpansionOutput), updated clampSearchLimit
  signature, recipe trust boundary, new test files
- docs/integrations/README.md: replace string-form health_check example
  with typed DSL (string checks now hard-block for non-embedded recipes);
  add recipe trust boundary subsection
- docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md: document file_upload remote-caller cwd confinement,
  symlink rejection, slug/filename allowlists

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-16 23:03:15 -07:00
Garry Tan
91ced664b6 feat: Voice v0.8.0 + feature discovery + Edge Function removal (#55) 
* chore: remove Supabase Edge Function MCP deployment

The Edge Function never worked reliably. All MCP traffic goes through
self-hosted server + ngrok tunnel. Removes deploy-remote.sh, edge-entry.ts,
supabase/functions/, .env.production.example, and CHATGPT.md (OAuth not
implemented).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: rewrite MCP docs for self-hosted + ngrok deployment

All per-client guides updated from Edge Function URLs to self-hosted
server + ngrok tunnel pattern. DEPLOY.md rewritten with local vs remote
paths. ALTERNATIVES.md now shows self-hosted as primary, with ngrok,
Tailscale, and Fly.io/Railway comparison.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: voice recipe v0.8.0 — 25 production patterns from real deployment

Identity separation, pre-computed bid system, conversation timing fix,
proactive advisor mode, radical prompt compression, OpenAI Realtime
Prompting Guide structure, auth-before-speech, brain escalation, stuck
watchdog, never-hang-up rule, thinking sounds, fallback TwiML, tool set
architecture, trusted user auth, caller routing, dynamic VAD, on-screen
debug UI, live moment capture, belt-and-suspenders post-call, mandatory
3-step post-call, WebRTC parity, dual API events, report-aware query
routing. WebRTC pseudocode updated with native FormData and 6 gotchas.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: post-upgrade feature discovery framework

upgrade.ts captures old version before upgrading, then execs
gbrain post-upgrade (new binary) to read migration files and print
feature pitches. Migration files get YAML frontmatter with feature_pitch
field (headline, description, recipe, tiers). CLI prints excited builder
tone post-upgrade. v0.8.0 migration offers voice setup with environment
detection (server vs local) and 3-tier progressive disclosure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add Voice section to README with WebRTC screenshot + tweet link

Her out of the box: voice-to-brain with 25 production patterns. WebRTC
client screenshot embedded. Remote MCP section rewritten for self-hosted
+ ngrok. Setup block genericized.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: add recipe validation tests + genericize personal refs

5 new integration tests: secrets completeness, semver version, requires
resolution, all-recipes-parse, no-personal-references. Test fixture
genericized. CLAUDE.md/TODOS.md/SKILLPACK updated for v0.8.0. build:edge
script removed from package.json.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.8.0)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-11 10:52:30 -10:00
Garry Tan
3e21e9b69b feat: GBrain v0.6.0 — Remote MCP Server + 12 Bug Fixes (#28) 
* fix: 7 bug fixes from Issue #9 and #22

- fix(mcp): use ListToolsRequestSchema/CallToolRequestSchema instead of string literals (Issue #9, PR #25)
- fix(mcp): handleToolCall reads dry_run from params instead of hardcoding false (#22 Bug #11)
- fix(search): keyword search returns best chunk per page via DISTINCT ON, not all chunks (#22 Bug #8)
- fix(search): dedup layer 1 keeps top 3 chunks per page instead of collapsing to 1 (#22 Bug #12)
- fix(engine): transaction uses scoped engine via Object.create, no shared state mutation (#22 Bug #2)
- fix(engine): upsertChunks uses UPSERT instead of DELETE+INSERT, preserves existing embeddings (#22 Bug #1)
- fix(slugs): validateSlug normalizes to lowercase, pathToSlug lowercases consistently (#22 Bug #4)
- schema: add unique index on content_chunks(page_id, chunk_index) for UPSERT support
- schema: add access_tokens and mcp_request_log tables via migration

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: embed schema.sql at build time, remove fs dependency from initSchema

initSchema() previously read schema.sql from disk at runtime via readFileSync,
which broke in compiled Bun binaries and Deno Edge Functions. Now uses a
generated schema-embedded.ts constant (run `bun run build:schema` to regenerate).

- Removes fs and path imports from postgres-engine.ts and db.ts
- Adds scripts/build-schema.sh for one-source-of-truth generation
- Adds build:schema npm script

Fixes Issue #22 Bug #6.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: 5 more bug fixes from Issue #22

- fix(file_upload): call storage.upload() in all 3 paths (operation, CLI upload, CLI sync) with rollback semantics (#22 Bug #9)
- fix(import): use atomic index counter for parallel queue instead of array.shift() race, preserve checkpoint on errors (#22 Bug #3)
- fix(s3): replace unsigned fetch with @aws-sdk/client-s3 for proper SigV4 auth, supports R2/MinIO via forcePathStyle (#22 Bug #10)
- fix(redirect): verify remote file exists before deleting local copy, skip files not found in storage (#22 Bug #5)
- deps: add @aws-sdk/client-s3

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: remote MCP server via Supabase Edge Functions

Deploy GBrain as a serverless remote MCP endpoint on your existing Supabase
instance. One brain, accessible from Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cowork,
Perplexity Computer, and any MCP client. Zero new infrastructure.

New files:
- supabase/functions/gbrain-mcp/index.ts — Edge Function with Hono + MCP SDK
- supabase/functions/gbrain-mcp/deno.json — Deno import map
- src/edge-entry.ts — curated bundle entry point (excludes fs-dependent modules)
- src/commands/auth.ts — standalone token management (create/list/revoke/test)
- scripts/deploy-remote.sh — one-script deployment
- .env.production.example — 3-value config template

Changes:
- config.ts: lazy-evaluate CONFIG_DIR (no homedir() at module scope)
- schema.sql: add access_tokens + mcp_request_log tables
- package.json: add build:edge script

Auth: bearer tokens via access_tokens table (SHA-256 hashed, per-client, revocable)
Transport: WebStandardStreamableHTTPServerTransport (stateless, Streamable HTTP)
Health: /health endpoint (unauth: 200/503, auth: postgres/pgvector/openai checks)
Excluded from remote: sync_brain, file_upload (may exceed 60s timeout)

Setup: clone, fill .env.production, run scripts/deploy-remote.sh, create token, done.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: per-client MCP setup guides

- docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md — deployment walkthrough, auth, troubleshooting, latency table
- docs/mcp/CLAUDE_CODE.md — claude mcp add command
- docs/mcp/CLAUDE_DESKTOP.md — Settings > Integrations (NOT JSON config!)
- docs/mcp/CLAUDE_COWORK.md — remote + local bridge paths
- docs/mcp/PERPLEXITY.md — Perplexity Computer connector setup
- docs/mcp/CHATGPT.md — coming soon (requires OAuth 2.1, P0 TODO)
- docs/mcp/ALTERNATIVES.md — Tailscale Funnel + ngrok self-hosted options

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.6.0)

GBrain v0.6.0: Remote MCP server via Supabase Edge Functions + 12 bug fixes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: add Remote MCP Server section to README

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: make document-release mandatory in CLAUDE.md, add MCP key files

Post-ship requirements section: document-release is NOT optional. Lists every
file that must be checked on every ship. A ship without updated docs is incomplete.

Also adds remote MCP server files to Key files section.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: batch upsertChunks into single statement to prevent deadlocks

The per-chunk UPSERT loop caused deadlocks under parallel workers because
each INSERT ON CONFLICT acquired row-level locks sequentially. Multiple
workers upserting different pages could deadlock on the shared unique index.

Fix: batch all chunks into a single multi-row INSERT ON CONFLICT statement.
One round-trip, one lock acquisition. COALESCE preserves existing embeddings
when the new value is NULL.

Fixes CI failure: "E2E: Parallel Import > parallel import with --workers 4"

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: advisory lock in initSchema() prevents deadlock on concurrent DDL

When multiple processes call initSchema() concurrently (e.g., test setup +
CLI subprocess, or parallel workers during E2E tests), the schema SQL's
DROP TRIGGER + CREATE TRIGGER statements acquire AccessExclusiveLock on
different tables, causing deadlocks.

Fix: pg_advisory_lock(42) serializes all initSchema() calls within the
same database. The lock is session-scoped and released in a finally block.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: add explicit test timeouts for CLI subprocess E2E tests

CLI subprocess tests (Setup Journey, Doctor Command, Parallel Import)
spawn `bun run src/cli.ts` which takes several seconds to JIT compile +
connect. The Bun test framework default 5000ms per-test timeout is too
tight for CI. Added 30-60s timeouts matching each subprocess's own
timeout to prevent false failures.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: infinite recursion in config.ts exported getConfigDir/getConfigPath

The replace_all refactor created recursive functions: the exported
getConfigDir() called the private getConfigDir() which called itself.
Renamed exports to configDir()/configPath() to avoid shadowing.

Also adds scripts/smoke-test-mcp.ts — verified all 8 MCP tool calls
work against a real Postgres database.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-10 15:23:00 -10:00